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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the coming of age of Internet dissemination of international
works of authorship, and the general ease of obtaining a variety of
international newspapers, records, and films, the current state of U.S. law
in the field of ascertaining choice of law in copyright matters remains in
an "isolationist position."' As asserted in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency
v. Russian Kurier, Inc., the "[c]hoice of law issues in international
copyright cases have been largely ignored in the reported decisions and
dealt with rather cursorily by most commentators." 2 Despite deeper
implications of foreign laws regarding international dissemination of
domestic works of authorship, U.S. courts are now engaging in complex
copyright choice of law analyses and are contemplating the application of
* Robert H. Thornburg is a Litigation Associate with the intellectual property law firm of
Allen, Dyer, Doppelt, Milbrath & Gilchrist, P.A. in Orlando, Florida. Mr. Thornburg received his
B.S. in Chemical Engineering, cum laude, from the University ofNotre Dame (1999), his J.D., with
honors, from the University of Florida (2002), and his L.L.M. in Intellectual Property Law, with
honors, from The John Marshall Law School (2004). Mr. Thomburg was the Spring 2002 Editor-inChief of the Journal of Technology Law & Policy.
1. William Patry, Choice ofLaw and International Copyright, 48 AMJ. CoMP. L. 383, 385
(2000).
2. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1998).
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foreign laws with little basis or knowledge of the underlying copyright
policies implicated under such laws.3
Rather than adopt a differential policy of recognizing foreign
intellectual property law systems, some domestic courts have evaded such
direct acknowledgment of these pervading issues. They have done so to
employ the easier approach of developing strategies to "limit the efficacy
of foreign intellectual property laws in favor of extraterritorial application
of domestic laws."4 A fundamental precept in copyright law is that the
Copyright Act has no extraterritorial application for actions outside the
United States.5 Although this rule is almost uniform throughout domestic
copyright jurisprudence, there is still some dispute among circuits
regarding the extent of this limitation in applying U.S. copyright law to
foreign acts.6 Specifically, there exists a split of authority regarding the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. copyright law between the Second7 and Ninth
Circuit' Courts of Appeals. The rift stems from whether U.S. copyright
law is implicated when a predicate act occurs within the United States
regarding an otherwise completely international dissemination of an
infringing work of authorship.
This Article outlines this apparent split of authority regarding the
extent of applying domestic copyright law towards almost exclusively
foreign activities. More importantly, this Article takes the position that this
split of authority should be eliminated. This Article also denotes both the
utter lack of uniformity and deference required when addressing foreign
law and the important underlying foreign cultural differences in addressing
choice of law in international copyright.
II.

ASCERTAINING WHETHER U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW CONTROLS

The U.S. Supreme Court has routinely stated that "[i]t is a longstanding
principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary

3. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, InternationalIntellectualPropertyLitigation:A Vehiclefor
Resurgent ComparativistThought?, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 429, 440-42 (2001).
4. Graeme W. Austin, Valuing "DomesticSelf-Determination"in InternationalIntellectual
PropertyJurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1155, 1168-69 (2002).
5. See MELVLLE B. NIRMER & DAVIDNIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, § 17.02, at 17-19
(2004).
6. See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in
TransnationalCopyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 10 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1998).
8. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
1994).
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intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States." 9 In accordance with this principle, U.S. copyright laws
generally have no application to extraterritorial infringement.'o In United
DictionaryCo. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., an opinion which predates the
1909 Copyright Act, Justice Holmes proclaimed this limitation upon
acquisition, and later enforcement, of a U.S. copyright." After passage of
the 1909 Copyright Act, courts remained cautious in applying U.S. law to
potentially infringing actions wholly occurring outside of U.S. borders. 2
Despite the numerous changes made upon passage ofthe Copyright Act
of 1976, Congress manifested no clear intent to change the preexisting
extraterritoriality doctrine. 3 The only apparent difference was Congress
chose, in the 1976 Act, to expand one aspect of territorial application of
U.S. Copyright by declaring that the unauthorized importation of
copyrighted works constitutes infringement, even when such copies were
lawfully made abroad. 4 In making such a minor change, Congress
demonstrated it was not inclined to overturn the predominant law stating
infringing acts wholly outside the United States, without any importation
within the country, are not actionable under the 1976 Act.'5 Thus, the
conventional rule under choice of law analysis has been that U.S.
copyright law may only apply if there is a specific step or action within the
United States affecting or causing a foreign infringement, traditionally
actionable under the Copyright Act.
A. The Ninth Circuit: Limiting Application of US. Copyright Law
Under Choice of Law
"... [I]f, and to the extent, a part of an 'act' of infringement occurs

within the United States, then, although such act is completed in a foreign
jurisdiction, those parties who contributed to the act within the United
States may be rendered liable under American copyright law."' 6 Under

9. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
10. NIMMER&NIMMER,supra note 5, § 12.04[A][3][b], at 12-92.
11. United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264-66 (1908).
12. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662 (2d Cir.
1955).
13. See Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
14. 17 U. S.C. § 602(a) (1976). The Copyright Act of 1909 did contain a similar provision that
prohibited "the importation into the United States . . . of any piratical copies of any work
copyrighted in the United States." Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1082, ch. 320, § 30.
15. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989).
16. NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 17-19 to 17-20.
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Peter Starr ProductionsCo. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit rule had traditionally been that, although "infringing actions that
take place entirely outside the United States are not actionable" under the
Copyright Act, an act of infringement within the United States properly is
alleged where the illegal authorization of international exhibitions takes
place in the United States.17 Thus, mere authorization within the United
States to improperly copy completely, outside of U.S. borders, created
subject matter jurisdiction under the Copyright Act. 8
However, this precedent was essentially overruled by the Ninth Circuit
in Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, Co.'9 In Subafilms,
defendant MGM/UA Communications authorized its subsidiary to
distribute the Beatles' infamous animated motion picture "Yellow
Submarine," despite being unsure whether its previous license allowed
such action.20 Plaintiff Subafilms brought suit against MGM/UA
contending that both the foreign and domestic distribution of the home
video constituted copyright infringement.2 ' Adopting the findings of a
special master, the trial court held MGM/UA had infringed and awarded
compensatory damages calculated based upon both foreign and domestic
infringement.22
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether MGM/UA's
authorization within the United States of wholly foreign activities,
regarding creating and disturbing copies of the film abroad, created subject
matter jurisdiction under the Copyright Act.2 3 First, the Ninth Circuit
followed its recent pronouncement in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo
of America, Inc.,24 asserting that, if a party authorizes an activity not
proscribed by one of the five section 106 clauses, such party cannot be
held liable as a copyright infringer. 2' Based upon the Copyright Act of
1976's failure to expand the scope of enforcement beyond § 602(a)' s cause
of action for importing an infringing work within the United States, the
Ninth Circuit found congressional intent to limit the scope and
applicability of the Copyright Act to essentially foreign acts.26 Thus, the

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Peter Starr Prods. Co. v. Twin Cont'l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43(9th Cir. 1986).
See id.
Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1099.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1090.
964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992).
Subaftlms, 24 F.3d at 1092.
Id. at 1094.
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Ninth Circuit overruled the Peter Starr holding, under choice of law
principles that mere authorization within the United States of entirely
extraterritorial acts fails to implicate U.S. copyright law."
The Ninth Circuit placed further limits upon the extraterritorial scope
of U.S. copyright law when it limited subject matter jurisdiction in
Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd., a case involving
two foreign competitors both selling their copyrighted works within the
United States.28 In Creative Technology, both plaintiff and defendant
designed, developed and manufactured computer sound cards in
Singapore, which were later imported and sold within the United States.2 9
Plaintiff Creative filed suit in the United States for infringement of its
twelve copyright registrations, while defendant Aztech filed a declaratory
relief action in Singapore under the Singapore Copyright Act. 30 Aztech
then filed a motion to dismiss the U.S. action under the forum nonconveniens doctrine which the trial court granted.31
On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the court centered its analysis on
the policy of national treatment pronounced under both the Universal
Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention. Under both treaties,
national treatment affords the same protection to foreign and domestic
copyright holders. 32 The Ninth Circuit in relying upon Subafilms asserted
that "'the applicable law is the copyright law of the state in which the
infringement occurred, not that of the state of which the author is a
national or in which the work was first published.' ' '33 However, in
ascertaining that adequate remedies existed under Singapore law,
Singapore law was capable of granting Plaintiff Creative the relief it
sought in the United States, both parties were companies operating under
the laws of Singapore, and Singapore could apply U.S. Copyright law to
Creative's counterclaims in the Singapore action, the Ninth Circuit found
that the Singapore court was the most appropriate forum. 34 Thus, the Ninth

27. Id. at 1099.
28. Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Labs, Inc., 61 F.3d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1995).
29. Id. at 699.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 700.
33. Creative Tech., 61 F.3d at 700-01 (quoting Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097(9th Cir. 1994)); see alsoNIMMER&NIMMER, supranote
5, § 17.05, at 17-39.
34. Creative Tech., 61 F.3d at 700-03.
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Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding of forum non-conveniens and its
refusal, under choice of law, to decide the dispute."
B. The Second CircuitPosition:Extending Subject Matter Jurisdiction
to ExtraterritorialActs Havingan Adverse Effect to U.S.
Copyright Interests
Under Second Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit law, many
domestic courts, in ascertaining under choice of law whether they have
subject matter jurisdiction to apply U.S. copyright laws, have begun to
narrow the traditional extraterritorial limitation pronounced in the Ninth
Circuit. The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, asserted that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws may be overcome if denying such
application would "result in adverse effects within the United States."36 A
year later, the Ninth Circuit questioned the extent of Massey regarding
extraterritorial copyright actions in Subafilms v. MGM-Pathe
Communications, when it stated, "the Massey court did not state that
extraterritoriality would be demanded in such circumstances."37
Regardless, the Second Circuit, in Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publishing,Ltd., pronounced in 1988 that extraterritorial application of
U.S. copyright law is permissible "when the type of infringement permits
further reproduction abroad."3 The doctrinal foundation for Update Art
was articulated fifty years earlier by the Second Circuit in Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.39 The Sheldon court reasoned, if a
defendant has made an unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work,
the copyright owner acquires an equitable interest in the infringing work
that "attache[s] to any profits from its exploitation, whether in the form of
money remitted to the United States, or of increase in the value of shares
of foreign companies held by the defendants. ' ' O The Subafilms court
directly expressed that this theory for expanding the reach of the Copyright
Act was not recognized in the Ninth Circuit.4 The Ninth Circuit has
further commented that the idea of expanding U.S. law, under international
35. Id. at 704.
36. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (expanding
extraterritorial actions in U.S. laws regarding the Sherman Act, Lanham Act, and domestic
securities laws).
37. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
38. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988).
39. 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); see Austin, supranote 6, at 9.
40. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52; see Austin, supra note 6, at 9.
41. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
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copyright choice of law disputes, fails because it attempts to create an
improper "equitable interest" under U.S. law for wholly created or copied
foreign works.42
In addition to Update Art, the Second Circuit also addressed in 1998,
international copyright choice of law issues in Itar-Tass Russian News
Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc.43 Most commentators assert the Itar-Tass
court "offered one of the most detailed choice of law analyses seen in
modem copyright cases."" Because the majority of courts had largely
ignored the important choice of law issues in international copyright cases,
the Second Circuit sought to articulate a federal rule to govern choice of
law in copyright cases. 45 Specifically, the Second Circuit applied a
variation on the approach of the Second Restatement of Conflicts, giving
primary weight in infringement matters to the lex loci delicti.46 Despite the
thoroughness of the Second Circuit's reasoning, however, commentators
have expressed some concern that digital distribution of copyrighted works
could cause the lex loci delicti rule to fail in the Internet age.47
In addition to its pronouncement on the issue of choice of law, the
Second Circuit, in Itar-Tass sought to expound upon how to ascertain
copyright ownership in the international forum. 48 The Second Circuit
asserted the Berne Convention fails to settle issues of international
ownership in copyright. 49 Rather, the Berne Convention "simply assures
that if the law of the country of infringement applies to the scope of
substantive copyright protection, that law will be applied uniformly to
foreign and domestic authors."5 The Second Circuit found that as
copyright is a form of property, choice of law should be based upon the
law of the country with "the most significant relationship to the property
and the parties."'" While the nationality of authors and the place of first
publication may support a choice of law for that country, the country of
origin may not always claim that it is the appropriate country concerning
ownership.52 Rather, the law of the country where the alleged infringement

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.at 1093-94.
153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
Dinwoodie, supra note 3, at 439.
See id.
Id.at 440.
See id.
See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 91.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.at 90-91.
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occurred governs the determination of whether the infringement has in fact
occurred.53
One year after the Second Circuit's pronouncement in Update Art and
Itar-Tass, the Southern District of New York decided an international
copyright case similar to Subafilms. In Shaw v. Rizzoli International
Publications,Inc.," an Italian-based defendant assembled and distributed,
between 1995 and 1996, a catalog of Marilyn Monroe photographs entitled
"Marilyn Monroe. The Life. The Myth." in both the United States and
Italy.55 Plaintiffs, a group of copyright holders of the original photographs,
brought suit and moved for summary judgment on the issue of
infringement, asserting that both the domestic and Italian disseminations
were actionable under U.S. copyright law.56 Defendant Rizzoli also moved
for partial summary judgment, asserting that, despite the holding in Update
Art, the Italian printing and distribution of the exhibition did not constitute
subject matter under copyright law.57
The district court stated that the Second Circuit still maintains the
position that "copyright laws generally do not have extraterritorial
application."" However, the court recognized the UpdateArt position that
it need only find a single "predicate act in the United States" to apply U.S.
copyright law to a dissemination made entirely outside the country.5 9 The
Rizzoli court asserted that, despite the Update Art single "predicate act"
rule, the Italian version of defendant Rizzoli's publications were entirely
compiled and printed in Italy by defendant.6" Thus, the Rizzoli court found
only the U.S. distribution of the work could constitute infringement under
U.S. copyright law and granted the defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment.61
Following the Rizzoli decision, which appeared to follow much of the
Ninth Circuit reasoning in Creative Technology,62 the reasoning by the
Southern District of New York in Deston Songs LLC v. Wingspan
Records63 demonstrates the clear rift between the circuits. In Deston, a
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
1988)).
59.

Itar-Tass, 153 F.3dat91.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3233 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1999).
Id. at *5-*6.
Id.at *6-*7.
Id.at *8.
Id. at *9 (quoting Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir.
Rizzoli, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3233, at *9.

60. Id. at *10-*11.

61. Id. at*12.
62. Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 700-03 (9th Cir. 1995).
63. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2001).
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complicated copyright ownership chain began when Toronto-based
composer Anslem Douglas, in early summer 1996, traveled to Port-ofSpain, Trinidad and visited music producer Carl Henderson to compose
the initial version of "Who Let the Dogs Out?"' Henderson declined to
produce the song, leading Douglas to collaborate with fellow Torontobased composer Ossie Gurley at Gurley's studio in Toronto under the
direction of New York producer Julian Williams. 5
In early 1998, Williams's U.S. record company released the song,
indicating Douglas as the composer and Gurley as the arranger. 66 The song
was distributed on a Caribbean music compilation, achieving only modest
success in the Caribbean. 7 Because of the song's lack of commercial
success, Douglas sold his rights to the song to Plaintiff Deston Songs.
Deston then granted a license to a Bahamian pop group, The Baha Men,
to sample then in the group's version of "Who Let the Dogs Out?"' 68 This
version became an overnight sensation in the late summer of 2000 and
won a Grammy Award.69 In October 2000, the New York producer of
Gurley and Douglas' original version, Julian Williams, filed suit in Ontario
Superior Court, asserting Gurley and Douglas assisted in developing the
original chorus for the song and were not given proper credit regarding
copyright ownership.7" Plaintiff Deston then filed a declaratory judgment
action, asserting that Williams had no right, title or interest in the song.7
Defendants moved to dismiss the U.S. action under the doctrine of forum
non-conveniens.72
The district court set out to ascertain, by applying a two-prong analysis,
whether a U.S. court constituted the most appropriate forum. 73 The first
prong is to examine whether an adequate alternative forum exists.74 If so,
then a court applies the second prong, balancing a series of factors
reflecting the private interests of the parties and the public interests at
stake, if any.75 The trial court specified that the defendant, in asserting the

64. Id. at *2-*3.
65. Id. at *3-*4.
66. Id. at *5.
67. Id. at *4-*5.
68. Deston, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763, at *7.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *7-*8.
71. Id. at*1.
72. Id.
73. Deston, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763, at *10 (citing GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 506-07 (1947)).
74. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07.
75. See id. at 508-09.
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U.S. forum is inappropriate, has the burden to demonstrate the adequacy
of an alternative forum.76 The court then asserted that "the plaintiffs
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."" In finding that none of the
community interests weighed against Deston's choice of forum, the district
court asserted, "[w]hen a lawsuit is based on events that occurred both at
home and abroad, the fact that some of the acts took place outside of the
United States is insufficient to overcome the presumptive deference to
plaintiff's choice of domestic forum. 78
Since Deston was a copyright holder residing in New York City, the
United States had a paramount interest in adjudicating the rights of such
a resident copyright holder. 79 Furthermore, while the defendant sought to
characterize the action as purely Canadian, because Canada was the place
where the original recording and composition occurred, the district court
pointed out only defendant Ossie Gurley was not an American citizen. °
Thus, although the Canadian court was an appropriate forum to resolve the
issues of ownership in the litigation, the Southern District refused to
dismiss the case under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens. 81
In Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov another district court governed by
Second Circuit precedent applied the above mentioned reasoning regarding
choice of law. 2 The district court ruled that, despite the fact numerous
issues would have to be resolved by applying Russian copyright law, the
United States was a more fair and appropriate forum to resolve issues of
copyright ownership under international copyright law.83 In Berov,
plaintiffs Films by Jove and Soyuzmultfim brought an action for copyright
infringement asserting rights against defendants Berov and Russian
publishing group St. Petersburg Publishing House." The suit addressed
ownership rights in approximately fifteen hundred animated films created

76. Deston, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763, at *10-*11.
77. Id.at *I I (citing Dirienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 232 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)).
78. Id. at *14 (citing Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
79. Id.at * 14-* 15 (citing Jose Armando Bermudez v. Bermudez Int'l, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12354, at *15 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 29, 2000) (asserting that "U.S. courts also have a strong interest in
enforcing the nation's copyright laws, as those laws are designed to protect authors creating works
in this country and, indirectly, the consuming public.")).
80. Id. at *16. Note that the original composer of "Who Let the Dogs Out?," Anslem
Douglas, was not a defendant in the U.S. copyright action before the Southern District of New
York. Id.at *2.
81. Deston, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763, at *9.
82. 250 F. Supp. 2d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
83. Id.at 192.
84. Id. at 158.
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by Soyuzmultfilm, a former Soviet state-owned film studio. 5 The district
summary judgment on the issue of ownership in
court previously granted
6
favor of plaintiffs.1
On reconsideration, the issue before the trial court was whether a
domestic U.S. court could ascertain ownership of copyright by applying
Russian law. 7 First, the district court essentially stated that based upon
several affidavits before it, many of the Russian expert opinions
addressing the legal constructs for Russian copyright ownership were
unduly influenced, giving little credence to a previous court proceeding. 8
Second, the district court provided a highly detailed account of the
progeny of Russian copyright ownership, from the time the Soviet state
expropriated ownership from the Russian Orthodox Church until
approximately 1989, when Russian law permitted certain forms of
copyright, leasing rights to allow more private dissemination for such
works.8 9 Defendants asserted that such leasing rights failed to confer any
ownership rights, but rather that the Soviet state continued to wholly own
any copyright interests in the works, which defendants had succeeded to. 90
The district court held that, despite all but one party being Russian citizens
or entities, it had the ability to interpret Russian law. 9' The district court
found that the lease right granted to plaintiffs caused a sufficient
ownership right in the animated films to accord copyright to those
entities.92
As shown by the prior line of cases, the Second Circuit and its lower
trial courts have greatly expanded the extraterritorial jurisdiction not only
to apply U.S. domestic copyright law, but also to engage, under choice of
law, in interpreting a foreign country's copyright laws.

III. CONCLUSION

The apparent split of authority between the Second and Ninth Circuits
regarding the expansiveness of the general rule limiting extraterritorial
application of copyright law further denotes that domestic courts remain

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id
Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160-161.
Id. at 163.
Id. at217.
Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
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in an "isolationist position."93 In expanding the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. copyright law and attempting, in many instances to interpret foreign
copyright law rather than simply dismissing the case under forum nonconveniens, the Second Circuit and its district courts have risked
undermining the inherent ability of foreign courts to address ownership
rights under the unique cultural and potential folk rights existing in their
respective countries. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's more restrictive
application of domestic copyright law, towards essentially foreign
distribution of domestic works of authorship generally ignores the
potential for such copies to have an indirect economic effect on U.S.
interests in such works. However, the fundamental rule that the Copyright
Act has no extraterritorial application for actions outside the United States
still prevades. 94
It remains burdensome to require federal courts to face the arduous task
of hiring foreign law experts and researching the nuances of a foreign
country's copyright laws, especially when such laws have been largely
unused or totalitarian.95 However, the technology of the Internet has
essentially created international dissemination of copyrighted works whose
ownership is arguably governed by the country of the initial distribution.
Therefore, it is likely that federal courts will more frequently be required
to address such issues. Such frequency, however, only emphasizes the
growing need for guidance on the issues of how to address ownership in
the international context and of what guidelines a court should follow in
deciding whether it should entertain international disputes.
Despite the Berne Convention's assertion that all countries should
accord national treatment towards foreign entities seeking copyright
protection, the treaty fails to provide any guidelines on the issue of choice
of law in international copyright disputes. Considering the largely
isolationist view of U.S. copyright law, and the apparent split of authority,
perhaps seeking international guidance through the World Trade
Organization would be the most appropriate course of action, apart from
the more immediate but limited ability of a U.S. Supreme Court case to
resolve this apparent rift.

93. Patry, supra note 1, at 384.
94. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 17-19.

95. See, e.g., Berov, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 156.

